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This paper introduces the general and specific straits of the structure, operation 
and transformation of party-states, with special focus on China. These traits may 
be revealed in the power network that evolved  from the dependency and interest 
promotion relationships among actors in the party, the state and the economy 
during the decision-making process. The network provides the dynamic context of 
economic, political and state decisions while also serves as a comparative framework 
for different party-states and their transformation. This framework allows the author 
to both categorize and confront with each other the several theoretical approaches 
regarding the Chinese economic and political system. 
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1. Introduction
There are multiple and divergent concepts sought to define a comprehensive 
analytical framework of the Chinese economic development and transformation. The 
differences in these concepts emerge in their approach of defining the authoritarian 
regime: predatory, socialist, developmental, neoliberal, entrepreneurial, power-
elite; the kind of capitalism: state capitalism, emerging system, hybrid system; and 
its sub-national varieties: variegated, polymorph, fragmented, entrepreneurial, 
competitive.1 
 *  The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the offical view 
of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
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One idea brings most of the multiple interpretations to common grounds: the 
authoritarian rule and the economic subfield is explicitly or tacitly considered 
a variety of a capitalist system. Owing to unanimous platform but varied focus, 
researchers are inclined to compare China not only with the European post-socialist 
systems, but also with developed capitalist systems, or with formerly authoritarian 
Asian capitalist regimes. Some of the enumerated concepts, however are either 
systemically opposed to or do not directly match those of capitalism, such as 
socialist market economy, state-socialism, post-communism. Thus, the puzzle 
becomes even more complex: is the Chinese system capitalist or communist? Is 
the Chinese system in the process of transformation or should be viewed as post-
communist? How can these opposing concepts be verified? 
The goal of this paper is to solve the puzzle by introducing a comprehensive 
interpretation of the general characteristics of the structure and dynamics of 
party-state systems and the specifics of the Chinese structure and transformation. 
This interpretation puts the above opposing approaches on common grounds. 
In the following sections a comparative party-state model will be introduced 
demonstrating the complexity of party-state systems, both during operation and 
transformation.2
2. The framework of comparison: the Interactive Party-State (IPS) 
model
The basis of comparison is the power network that evolved historically, represented 
by the Interactive Party-State (IPS) model (Csanádi 2016). The IPS model is a bottom-
up construction that comprises the self-similarities and differences of party states 
as outcomes of the structural characteristics of power distribution. In terms of both 
dependency and interest promotion, there are strongly intertwined relationships 
among decision-makers in the party, the state, and the economy. This leads to 
a specific process of decision-making, which is responsible for the emergence of 
systemic power networks (Figure 1). 
2  Owing to the very complexity of party-state systems, the multiplicity of their structural systemic specifics, 
the influence of the individual structural features of the concrete national and/or subnational level unit, 
as well as its longer-term geopolitical- and actual international conditions, the author limits herself to 
describe the general and specific properties of the system as well as its dynamics of self-reproduction 
and transformation. Though the model stresses that individual power distributions in party-states strongly 
influence the sequence, speed, and conditions of transformation and thus, the characteristics of outcomes, 
it does not forecast possible blueprints of outcomes of the process. Due to the complexity and cumulated 
uncertainty of a transformation process (Bunce and Csanádi 1993), the different interaction of the same 
facts could allow even opposite outcomes. Therefore, based on the logic of the model, forecasting any 
concrete life-span of the system or outcome of system transformation – considering the Chinese structure, 
its unprecedented transformation elsewhere and its cumulated uncertainties – would lack foundations. 
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Main elements of the party-state network are as follows: (1) The party hierarchy, 
which monopolizes the political sub-sphere. (2) The state hierarchy, which 
monopolizes the economic sub-sphere and, therefore, the extraction and 
distribution of resources. (3) Interlinking dependency lines, which origin in the 
party hierarchy as its instruments of power that reach out to structures of positions, 
activities, organizations and individuals in non-party hierarchies. (4) Short-cuts 
(structural feedbacks) in the decision-making process integrating those privileged, 
within both party and state hierarchies as well as across state and party hierarchies. 
The possible connections between these network elements follow some simple 
principles (see Figure 1). Interlinking dependency lines can originate only in 
the party hierarchy, since they are the power instruments of the Party (e.g. the 
nomenklatura system). In turn, feedbacks between the two hierarchies can origin 
only in non-party hierarchies, because the loop of feedback is formed by interlinking 
dependency lines that originate in the party hierarchy (Csanádi 2016).
Due to these principles of connection, the operation of the network also follows 
certain specific rules. Since each actor commands dependency lines originating in 
its own hierarchy, while only actors in party hierarchy command dependency lines 
interlinking all other actors, the dependencies, the promotion of interests, and the 
extraction and distribution of resources are, either directly or indirectly, politically 
monopolized. Specifics of the elements, the connecting and operating principles of 
this network will bring about politically rational economic interest and behavior of 
Figure 1
Main elements of the party-state network and paths of dependency and interest 
promotion (a-i)
1. Closed channels
2. Unidirectional but multithreaded dependencies
3. Direct connection between the party and non-party 
    decision-makers – sensitivity to each other’s decision
4. Atomized actors (weak horizontal connections)
5. The possibility of multi-threaded interest promotion
6. Structural inequalities in the ﬁeld of dependency, 
    interest promotion and resistance through interlinking 
    threads (D2; I2) and feedbacks (I3)
7. The bargaining capacity and the formal positions 
    do not match
8. Bargaining capacities of diﬀerent strength will 
    determine the distribution of power in the network 
S – State (non-party) hierarchy; 
P – Party hierarchy; 
An – Decision-makers (actors) at the n
th level 
         of the structure; 
D1 – Direction of intra-hierarchy dependence; 
D2 – Direction of cross-hierarchy dependence; 
I1 – Path of intra-hierarchy interest promotion; 
I2 – Path of cross-hierarchy interest promotion; 
I3 – Direction of feedbacks.
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actors (Csanádi 2006). These latter arise on the one hand, in the politically rational 
selective distribution and extraction of resources and in privileges biased towards 
large state owned economic units that are cumulatively integrated into the network 
during the decision-making process; on the other hand, politically rational economic 
behavior and interests predominate in the drive for growth, hoarding resources and 
accumulating connections (feedbacks). 
In this network actors are simultaneously holders of and embraced by dependency 
lines, thus incorporating the functions of distributor and extractor of resources 
and those of pleader in one single entity. Accordingly, actors in the network have 
capacity to extract, attract, and distribute resources, and resist to or benefit from 
state and party interventions. We call these capacities together as constraints of 
self-reproduction within the network. However, the extent of these constraints are 
not uniform: they differ according actors’ different capacities to attract, extract, 
distribute resources and resist intervention as a result of actors’ bargaining 
position within the network. The better the bargaining position the softer are the 
constraints of self-reproduction, the worse the bargaining position the harder are 
the constraints of self-reproduction. Actors strive to soften their constraints through 
politically rational economic behavior within the network.
Consequently, state intervention and role of the state in party-state systems cannot 
be simplified to the activity of an authoritarian and paternalistic regime and its 
bureaucracy (Kornai 1994) despite the fact that the state monopolized the state-
owned economy and thereby the extraction and distribution of resources. Owing to 
elements, principles of connection and operation, the instruments of power of the 
Party permeate non-party institutions,3 Within those, interlinking lines reach out 
to positions, organizations, activities and individual party members. Consequently, 
both indirectly through the monopolizing state and by directly reaching out to 
positional, activity and organizational structure and individuals in the non-party 
sphere, the Party politically monopolizes the state-owned economy and thereby 
the resource extraction and distribution. Thus the state and its actors’ behavior 
and motivation during the process of decision-making should be interpreted in the 
context of the party-state network.
The main elements, the main connecting and operating principles of this network, 
the politically rational interests and behavior, as well as its consequences on 
selective resource distribution according to bargaining capacities are self-similar 
(Csanádi 2016). In other words, these fundamental characteristics will not differ 
over time and space (i.e. in different regions and countries or even units at the same 
sub-national level) and levels of aggregation (national and sub-national levels). 
3  These are for example, state-owned or state controlled enterprises, schools, cultural or health-care units, 
the army, the police, the trade union, the different level authorities and their organizations, including central 
government and government hights, the Parliament, the state council etc.
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Despite these self-similarities, however, major elements might have various 
configurations, which result in a vast variety of structural characteristics of power 
distribution over various party states. Differences in the distribution of power 
depend on several structural factors: the combination of the level of strictness 
within party and state hierarchies (e.g. compulsory or indirect planning); how 
centralized the origins of interlinking lines in the party hierarchy are; to what 
sub-fields they reach out, how dense they are and “deep” they go in non-party 
hierarchy; how centralized the extraction and distribution of resources along 
the state hierarchy is; from which level the structural feedbacks within and 
between hierarchies originate; to what level these feedbacks reach in party and/
or state hierarchies; and what is the extent of actors’ integration into the network 
reflected by the location and accumulation of structural feedbacks. The different 
combination of these structural factors will be responsible for the differences of 
power distribution among various party states combined with individual specifics 
(e.g. size, geopolitical location, economic development, cultural traditions etc.) 
(Csanádi, 1997, 2006).
These varieties may be grouped in three characteristically different patterns of 
power distribution: these are the Self-exploiting, Self-disintegrating and Self-
withdrawing patterns. Each pattern is characterized by the different combination 
of three main pattern-forming elements and may have countless varieties within 
it while keeping the main pattern characteristics. These are (1) the level of 
centralization of the interlinking lines that origin in the party hierarchy, (2) the 
level of centralization of the extraction and distribution of resources in the state 
hierarchy, and (3) the density and strength of feedbacks within or across the 
hierarchies. 
These characteristics will determine the pattern-conforming distribution of power 
and thereby actors’ capacities to extract, attract, and distribute resources, and 
resist to or benefit from state and party interventions within the power network. 
For the self-exploiting pattern, the origins of interlinking lines within the party 
hierarchy as well as the extraction and distribution of resources within the state 
hierarchy are centralized, while feedbacks in the network are weak or scarce. 
This pattern prevailed in the Soviet Union during Stalin, in the 1950s in Eastern 
Europe and China, and until the revolution in 1991 in Romania and to date in North 
Korea. This pattern of party-state system is usually called as classical or communist 
system (Bolesta 2012) that operates with compulsory planning and forced resource 
allocation. In the self-disintegrating pattern interlinking lines in the party hierarchy 
are relatively decentralized, while the extraction and distribution of resources in the 
state hierarchy is centralized, and feedbacks are strong. In this pattern decentralizing 
reforms within the network are the main means of resource extraction and 
distribution. In the self-withdrawing pattern the origins of interlinking lines within 
the party hierarchy as well as the extraction and distribution of resources in the 
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state hierarchy are relatively decentralized and feedbacks are strong. In this pattern 
instruments of resource extraction and distribution are combined, decentralizing 
reforms within the network and resource creating reforms outside of it (Naughton 
1996). 
The distribution of power within the different patterns may change: variations 
within the pattern may occur in time, space and aggregation levels. Moreover, 
distribution of power may also shift patterns, and all patterns may transform into 
another system. Transformations are pattern-conforming (in detail see Csanádi 
2006, 2016). In the following section the specifics of the Chinese pattern will be 
described along its evolution from one pattern to the other combined with the 
gradual system transformation. Transformation will be interpreted as a two-fold 
process (1) the retreat of the network from monopolized sub-spheres and (2) the 
expansion of the field outside of the network. 
3. The development of the network structure in China 
By the end of the 1950s a version of Self-exploiting (centralized) pattern of power 
distribution evolved in China that due to several drastic decentralization campaigns 
initiated by Mao during the „Great Leap Forward” and the Cultural Revolution 
repeatedly partially and temporary collapsed, and finally by the second half of 
the 1970s regenerated in a decentralized pattern. The decentralized nature of 
the Chinese power network means the subordination of state owned enterprises 
to the discretion of different level government organizations first carried out 
repeatedly during the Mao era. Administratively, the lower the rank of the 
government level, the smaller the size and importance of the subordinated SOEs 
to these governments. By the time Deng Xiao Ping took power this pattern has 
stabilized: a relatively decentralized resource extraction and distribution, relatively 
decentralized interlinking lines from the party hierarchy that overlapped positional, 
activity and organizational structure and individuals in non-party fields and strong 
feedbacks reaching to higher levels of the party and state hierarchy.4 Thus, during 
this historical process the Chinese system changed from a variety of self-exploiting 
pattern to a variety of self-withdrawing pattern. 
Also instruments of resource extraction and distribution gradually adapted to 
the new pattern. Adaptation was necessary as forced resource redeployment 
implemented during the period of the centralized pattern did not work due to the 
increased resisting capacity of actors in the decentralized pattern (Csanádi 2011). 
4  For example, managers of large state owned enterprises are members of the Central Committee of the CCP, 
and over 50 SOE top managers (party secretary, CEO and chairman of the board are in the nomenklatura 
responsibility of the Central Organization Department reviewed and approved by the Standing Committee of 
the Politburo http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/10_26_11_CapitalTradeSOEStudy.pdf p. 75.
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From the early mid-1980s, decentralizing (resource revealing) reforms within 
the party-state network were introduced both in agriculture and industry. In 
agriculture, decentralizing reforms delegated expanded decision-making rights 
for rural households. The scope and quantity of compulsory production for state 
procurement was narrowed, higher prices in state procurement were applied. 
Decentralization in agriculture was pre-empted from the end of 1970s by the partial 
retreat of the network: communes were dissolved, household responsibility system 
was introduced, and interlinking lines formerly attached to communes were left in 
limbo or transferred to formal collectives. Also dual-track pricing was implemented 
to sell over-the-plan products for market prices, thereby expanding the field outside 
the network. Similar process took place in industry by mid 1980s in the form of the 
dual-track pricing.
Decentralization of decisions accelerated as SOEs and sub-national government 
authorities gained formerly centralized discretions that were accompanied by the 
larger jurisdiction of sub-national party authorities. Consequently, decentralization 
of decisions and resources in the specific Chinese pattern further increased local 
decision-making power, resource attracting, extracting and distribution capacities as 
well as resisting capacities to higher level intervention reflected in the institutional 
and decision-making structure. The process of decentralization of power distribution 
within the network – with some exceptions (e.g. 1994 resource centralizing tax 
reforms) – continued throughout the decades that further strengthened the 
decentralized character of the Chinese power network. Decentralized power 
distribution, institutional responsibilities and respective management of economic 
development are reflected also in the share of central and local investments in 
fixed assets despite various revenue centralizing efforts since mid1990s. According 
to Szamosszegi and Kyle (2011, p. 33, Figure IV-1), in 2009, investments in fixed 
assets undertaken, overseen and permitted by sub-national governments was 
overwhelming in all sectors, including manufacturing (95 per cent), real-estate (98 
per cent), construction (92 per cent), mining (68 per cent) and different services 
(between 99 and 48 per cent). 
The increased local bargaining and resisting capacities in turn, occasionally increased 
the frequency of hardening reproduction constraints of the whole network when 
resources to distribute ran out (Csanádi 2005). Central reactions to tensions 
culminated in the Tiannanmen Square protests and its bloody clamp down in 1989. 
This provoked economic restrictions and political centralization efforts and thereby 
the temporary expansion of the network until 1991. But centralizing efforts soon 
failed, the economy slowed down critically hardening reproduction constraints 
of the Chinese power network. From 1992 onwards, parallel with the process of 
further decentralization, the relative and absolute retreat of the network gained 
speed, gradually expanding the economic sub-sphere outside the network. Thus 
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decentralizing reforms within the specific power distribution strongly contributed to 
the acceleration of the retreat of the network by forcing the government to seek for 
new resources to distribute by leaping out of the network. The decentralization of 
resources, decision-making capacities and new instruments of resource extraction 
and distribution within the network, however, did not change the self-similar 
characteristics of party-state systems. For example, the distribution of resources 
at all levels remained politically rational. 
4. The Chinese transformation, a pattern-dependent variety of the 
transforming party-states
The process of decentralization, the frequency of hitting hardening reproduction 
constraints and the frequency of reforms are interrelated. The increased 
decentralization of decisions within the network further redistributed the power 
towards local levels and lead to increased resisting capacity to central intervention 
driving the system towards growing frequency of hardening reproduction constrains. 
This forced the escalation of pattern-specific instruments of self-reproduction from 
outside the network and thereby the gradual expansion of the market sphere. 
This process underlies that it is the Chinese pattern of power distribution and 
dynamics that provides the structural background of the „Chinese style” reforms 
and transformation. Its characteristics: the gradual, decentralizing reforms within 
the decentralized network and the gradual reforms outside the network expanding 
the market sphere, reflect a process of economic transformation first, under 
authoritarian rule accompanied by macro-economic growth.5 During this process, 
party legitimacy prevailed as resources extracted from the expanding private sphere 
could be redistributed within the network allowing its reproduction along the self-
similar distributional priorities. 
As we have already mentioned, the process of absolute retreat of the network 
begun in the agriculture at the end of the 1970s, dissolving communes and creating 
household responsibility system. This move went parallel with the decentralization 
of decisions within the network in the industry in order to bring decisions to 
the level of real economy. This process was labelled enterprise and manager 
responsibility system regarding production, marketing, investment decisions, 
expansion plans, and staff, that also provided profit retention opportunities. 
Parallel to decentralization within the network competitive capital, manpower 
and organizations strip of – empty – the network to join the expanding market 
sphere. At the same time alternative capital, actors and interests enter the network 
as owners in joint ventures, shareholders, members in Peoples’ Parliament or in 
5  Chinese pattern of power distribution and transformation specifics differ from that of its former European 
counterparts’. These patterns transform either first politically rather than economically or through abrupt 
collapse of the network and parallel transformation of all subfields (see in detail Csanádi 2006, 2016).
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inter-ministerial committees that provided new sources of the self-reproduction 
of the network. This process, owing to the infiltration of alternative decisions, 
interests, organizations, while providing resources, formally and informally 
weakens the influence of the party on the economy through the network. Parallel 
to decentralization, the emptying and weakening of the network, also former 
distributive functions were withdrawn from lower levels allowing enterprises 
greater freedom in deciding about investments up to a certain volume. These moves 
of absolute retreat were intensified from the mid 1990s when the network has been 
increasingly cut through privatization, close-downs and bankruptcy of first TVEs 
(township and village enterprises) and later state-owned enterprises, leaving the 
direct interlinking and hierarchical lines in limbo. Opposite efforts may be perceived 
simultaneously by the Party to expand its formal and informal influence on the 
private sphere through private or collective enterprises founded by local party 
executives, or by succeeding to form party cells in non-public enterprises, involving 
there 3,5 million party members (Thornton 2012) and integrate powerful private 
interests into different segments and levels of the network.
The relative retreat of the network through the higher speed of expansion of the 
sphere outside the network may be illustrated by the market field that began to 
expand when the dual-track pricing regulations were introduced both in agriculture 
and industry that allowed producers to sell their over-the plan agricultural and 
industrial products on market prices. Besides dual track system, further expansion of 
the market was allowed by „opening up” (Weingast 1995; Walder 1995; Naughton 
1996). This move attracted resources from the global economy in the form of FDI 
in green field investments outside the network or in economic units embraced by 
the network. New private enterprises (both domestic and foreign) were allowed to 
be set up, the number of special economic zones were increased and investment-
friendly laws were implemented that attracted foreign capital. Further expansion 
was boosted by those who transferred capital, organization and skills and manpower 
from the network to the private sphere and by those SOEs and collective units who 
were privatized. All of these activities stimulated the fast growth of rural to urban 
migration absorbed by the expanding competitive sphere. 
5. Adaptation to external shocks in the transforming Chinese pattern
Pressures during operation and during transformation will influence the 
advancement or retreat of state functions and the implementation of monetary 
or fiscal means (Yu 2010). However, shock induced by the crisis activates state 
interventions, interventions activate the decision-making network, the network 
in turn, activates the system characteristics of resource distribution and intensifíy 
the structural motivation of economic units for growth and thereby for repetitive 
investment overheating. Owing to self-similar characteristics of the network, 
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overheating is present in time, space and different aggregation levels, during the 
self-reproduction and the transformation of the network. 
Owing to strong resisting capacity to interventions within its network, China’s party-
state pattern is highly sensitive to hardening external and internal constraints both 
in case of their alternative or simultaneous occurrence and length of prevalence. 
Empirical research results reveal that despite China’s substantial transformation 
towards a market economy, the occasional need for increased state intervention 
has mobilized the general characteristics of the party-state system at all aggregation 
levels temporary increasing the expansion of the network also to different extent 
at sub-national levels according to pattern and individual specifics. 
The stimulus package introduced in 2008 was the direct adaptive consequence 
of an external shock caused by the global crisis and the subsequent government 
reaction in the form of intensified state intervention that mobilized economic 
actors. In fact, state intervention opened up new chances for selective resource 
distribution in the form of central, local budgetary and bank resources in the 
western and central regions, in the construction sector, and in some sectors of 
manufacturing with preference given to large-size and state-owned enterprises 
and cumulatively integrated enterprises in the decision-making processes through 
the network (Csanádi and Liu 2012). Newly opening chances similarly mobilized 
the politically rational economic behavior of actors to hoard resources and invest. 
This phenomenon took shape during the implementation of a stimulus package 
after 2008. The locus of increasing activity in both the geographical space and the 
hierarchy of aggregation levels was determined by the specifics of decentralized 
Chinese party-state system and the decentralized distribution of responsibilities 
and chances to extract and allocate resources. Input requirements of the privileged 
construction sector mobilized enterprises in manufacturing that contributed to the 
investment overheating, excess capacity, non-performing loans, local indebtedness 
and slower GDP growth. The structural impact of the stimulus package empirically 
supports the fact that owing to the political rationality of economic behavior in the 
system, market-conforming “personnel policy” incentives and decentralization of 
fiscal decisions within the network will be “translated” to politically rational rather 
than efficiency oriented behavior while promoting economic growth as expected 
by Knight (2012) based on the concept of developmental state. 
Concluding this section: systemic characteristics of the party-state together with 
their Chinese specifics resulted in the transitory expansion or slowing retreat of the 
network owing to investment overheating and steadily growing local indebtedness 
through large and state-owned enterprises and local governments and the transitory 
slow-down of market expansion. The features of China’s transforming economy 
further amplified this process, since the increased demand for inputs on the side 
of enterprises which state intervention privileged due to its systemic priorities, also 
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mobilized actors in the private sphere according to privileged sectors, regions and 
the ownership and scale of enterprises. Thus, overheating amplified while network 
expansion proved to be transitory (Csanádi 2013; Yu 2010). 
Based on the above, we may also conclude that the transformation dynamics is not 
a linear process on national or local levels: speed and conditions of transformation 
are constantly in move due to the changing dynamics of the retreating network and 
emerging market sphere, the changing dynamics of internal and external pressures 
and their interaction. 
6. Conclusions
The aim of the study was to define the main system characteristics of the emerging 
Chinese market, the structural characteristics of the „Chinese style” as well as the 
state’s behavior in the context of those characteristics. Based on the implemented 
comparative analytical model supported by empirical research we argue that the 
Chinese system and its specifics should not be pressed into the present standards 
of varieties of capitalism. China’s social system is communist, described with 
a politically monopolized power network between actors in the party, the state and 
the economy, with its self-similar elements, principles of connection and operation 
in time, space and levels of aggregation. Rather than being a developmental state, 
the Chinese party-state is a structural variety of the patterns of power distribution 
characterized by decentralized power network with pattern-conforming instruments 
of resource extraction and distribution: resource creating reforms outside the 
network and decentralizing reforms within the network. Chinese system’s pattern-
conforming operation simultaneously leads to specific sequence, speed and 
conditions of system transformation. The sequence is: economic transformation 
first, as the network is retreating first from the economic subfield while the market 
field outside the network is expanding. The speed of the transformation process is 
gradual, while conditions of economic transformation and thereby the emerging 
market are defined by an authoritarian regime and accompanied by macroeconomic 
growth that preserves party legitimacy. Thus, the Chinese communist system should 
be compared to – but not identified with – other present or former transforming 
party-state systems with similar or different patterns of power distribution. 
At the same time, the transforming Chinese communist system and the transformed 
post-socialist systems are not comparable on common systemic grounds. Moreover, 
China is not an outlier capitalist system, neither is a socialist market economy in 
itself, or a developmental state without the communist system characteristics 
described by the Interactive Party-State model. Instead, it is one of the well 
embedded patterns of the communist power network in a period of system 
transformation. State’s role and expanding or shrinking market at any level and 
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time should be interpreted in strong interaction with the dynamics of the retreating 
or expanding network and those of domestic and external pressures. Therefore, 
the role and behavior of the state at central and local levels in China should also be 
interpreted in the context of the transforming politically monopolized decentralized 
power network, and its dynamics – both at „normal” times and at crisis situations. 
Economic functions, actions, organizations and behavior of the central and local 
governments should be analyzed embedded in the power network. Similar 
contextual approach should be used to analyze behavior of groups, organizations, 
or individual actors. 
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